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ABSTRACT

CHILDREN'S AND ADULTS' ABILITY TO GENERALIZE
PROPERTIES TO
NOVEL OBJECTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF
CATEGORIZATION

SEPTEMBER 1998

KRISTEN N. ASPLIN,

B. A.,

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS COLLEGE

M. S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Charles

E.

Clifton

This study investigated people's ability to draw

inferences from known objects to new kinds of objects.

An

illustrative example is the ability to generalize a rule,
such as a member of species X will have offspring of species
X, to a newly discovered species Y.

This ability remains

unexplained by certain connectionist models and models of
categorization other than the Theory Theory.

This thesis utilized a method from Keil (1989), where

objects were transformed to appear like other objects.
Fifteen, seven- and ten-year-olds and adults each, were told

stories of surgeons who transformed natural kinds objects to

look like other natural objects (e.g. raccoon to skunk),

artifacts to look like different artifacts (e.g. umbrella to
flag) and novel natural objects to look like familiar natural

objects (e.g. hoatzin
wings

-

- a

bird that climbs trees with its

to goose)
V

Younger children usually
stated that all objects
had
Changed and that offspring
would loo. llKe the
transformed
Object. Ten-year-olds
and adults, however,
often responded
that natural kinds had not
changed and would have
offspring
ixke their original
appearance. More
importantly, no

differences between responses
to novel and familiar
natural
scenarios were found. All
participants who judged that
a
Plant or animal would have
babies like the original
object
made this judgment for both
novel and familiar
scenarios.

TO more fully examine the
participants responses, their
explanations of their answers were
categorized into three
types Of reasoning: perceptual,
functional
/behavioral, and

biological.

AS expected, perceptual
reasoning decreased in
frequency with age, and biological
increased with age on the

natural scenarios

.

artifact scenarios.

Functional reasoning increased on
the

Examining the justifications explored
an

unexpected pattern of responses, where
participants believed
the object to have changed, but the
offspring would
appear

like the original object.

In this experiment participants treated
the novel and

familiar scenarios equally.

This result provides

exceptionally clear evidence that children's and
adults'
theories of natural kinds must include a rule or
variable-

manipulating system, and they can generalize that rule to
novel natural kinds.

Therefore, a rule or variable-

VI

manipulating system is necessary
in all model,
categorization.

vii
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

The last decade has seen
a new direction in
the
development of models of
categorization. Previous
models
relied on features or
properties of objects to
categorize the
world (Smith . Medin, 1981;
Rosch, 1978,. The newer
Theory
Theory builds on previous
models by adding a second
level of

explanation.

Proponents of the Theory Theory
(e.g. Gopnik
Meltzoff, 1997) postulate that,
besides using features to
categorize an object, a person has
a naive theory, or
concept. Of why an object belongs
in a category, while this
new hypothesis can account for many
previously unexplained
facts, as will be described below,
there are still more facts
waiting to be explained. One phenomenon
that remains
«,

unexplained is people's ability to
generalize information
from previous knowledge to new kinds
of objects. People can
generalize known properties to a new object
when they
assign

it to a known category.

For example, imagine you are seeing

your first tiger, but you have already seen
small cats,
lions, and leopards before, you can infer
that, as

a feline,

the tiger could be a carnivore and would
therefore be

dangerous

.

This thesis attempts to show that models of

categorization must include a mechanism for this type of
generalization or inference.

Marcus (in press) proposes that

a rule system or an algebraic, variable-manipulating
system

1

can provide that mechanise,
and this ^echaniSM can
best
account for the data that
are presented here.

Early Models of ratoq^,-^

lon

The Classical view of
categorization defines concepts
in
terms of a list of necessary
and sufficient conditions
(see
smith . Medin, 1981 for a review).
Such a list of conditions
would amount to a definition
resembling those found
in a

dictionary.

For example, we might define
an odd nuirDer as
the set Of numbers that give a
remainder of one when divided
by two, or we might define a chair
as something with four
legs, an upright back support,
and a flat space parallel to
the ground that can support a human
in a seated position.

This model is inadequate, however, since
researchers

have been unable to enumerate the list of
necessary and
sufficient conditions for most concepts, instead,
for most
categories, there are exceptions for nearly every
feature

that has been proposed.

To continue with the chair

illustration from above, there are three-legged chairs,
backless chairs, and bean bag chairs which do not seem to
have

any features in common with other chairs.

Even if we exclude

bean bags as aberrant chairs, we might only retain the

feature "space that can support a seated human."

This

reduction of features to only that which is necessary
produces the opposite problem:

the remaining feature is not

2

sufficient to select only the
objects in the world that
are
Chairs. Not everything that
can acconunodate a seated
person
xs a Chair (e.g. table,
desk, etc.). caught
between being
too general and too specific,
researchers have been unable
to
identify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for all
but
a few concepts (Smith
& Medin, 1981).
These concepts
include, notably, mathematical
terms like "odd nuu^er" where
the necessary and sufficient
condition is "a number
that,

when divided by two, gives a
remainder of one."

This inadequate model of
categorization was replaced in
the 1970 's with a class of models
that use features in more
flexible ways to define a category.
The family resemblance,
prototype and similarity models, postulated
by Rosch and
other researchers, no longer use static
lists of necessary
and sufficient conditions. For these
models, a category is a

similarity space whose dimensions are features.

This

category space has a center which is sometimes
called a
prototype (e.g. Rosch, 1978).
the prototype

m

theory, the

prototype is the ideal instantiation of the concept.

By

using a comparison function, an individual exemplar is

measured against the prototype or feature dimensions of the
category.

Unlike the all-or-none list of features in the

classic view of categorization, this type of comparison
allows for grading of exemplars.

An exemplar can be a better

or worse member of a category (e.g. a dining room chair vs. a

bean-bag chair), based on its similarity to the ideal

3

exemplar or category center.

These models can also account

for fuzzy boundaries for
a concept, as they allow
the
similarity function to determine
whether an object is a
member of one of two similar
categories, if an exemplar
is
somewhat similar to the prototypes
for two categories, but
not a good exemplar of one
(e.g. is a tomato a fruit
or a
vegetable,, the boundary between
the two categories may be
unclear.

Pro blems with Featur e-Based Mnri^ig

These similarity models still rely on
features to
categorize objects, and therefore cannot
explain certain
observations in categorization. Murphy and
Medin (1985) and
Keil (1994), among others, have argued that
although

feature-

based models can explain much of the way our
minds categorize
the world, another level of explanation is also
necessary.

Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1983) tested whether
all categories could fit into either the classical view
of

categorization or into the family resemblance view.

According to the classical view, categories are strictly
defined by necessary and sufficient features; they have no
graded membership or internal structure.

An exemplar is

either a member of the category or it is not, and there is no

mechanism to compare members within the category,

in the

family resemblance or similarity models, categories have

4

graded structure and graded
™e,^ership based on similarity
to
a prototype, or other feature
dimensions, with these two
types Of models as options for
the structure of categories,
categories either have both graded
structure within a
category and graded membership
between
categories, or they do

not,

To test if all categories had
graded structure, the
researchers first gave participants
a list of items from the
categories of odd numbers and fruit
(among other category
lists) and asked them to rate the
"goodness of fit" of each
of the examples to the category label
on a seven point scale.

A "very good" example of an odd number was
rated a

1,

and a

"very poor" example of an odd number would be
rated a 7. The
researchers found that the number "3" received
an average
rating of 1.6, and the number "447" a rating of
3.7.
Similar

differences in the ratings for fruit were also obtained.

cherry was rated 1.7 and a coconut was rated 4.8.

A

it seemed

that both categories did have graded structure within the
category.

To test if both categories had graded membership

participants were asked whether it made sense to ask someone
about the degree of membership that 447 had as an odd number,
and coconut had as a fruit.

All of the participants said

that it did not make sense to ask this question for the odd
numbers, but 57 percent said it did make sense for the fruit.

The participants seemed to agree that all odd numbers are odd
numbers, whether or not they are "good" odd numbers.

5

In

contrast, judging the graded
meiri^ership of the category
of
fruit seemed to make sense to
the subjects.

Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman
had found that while
the category of odd number had
graded structure within the
category (as in a family resemblance
model of a category) it
was still rigidly defined by a
set of features, as in the

classical view of categorization.

The similarity class of

models, like those of Rosch and her
colleagues, could not
predict that graded membership and graded
structure were
separable. Therefore, some other mechanism
or level of

explanation must exist, which can decide between
all-or-none
vs. graded membership types of categories.

Another phenomenon for which the early models of

categorization have yet to account is the differences

existing between broad classes of knowledge.

Previous models

categories (e.g. Rosch, 1978) have shown that there are

hierarchies for where more specific categories are contained

within larger, more general categories.

The large, general

categories are called superordinate categories, and include
things like "furniture" or "animals."

One of the most

significant superordinate distinctions that has been

investigated is the separation of natural kinds from
artifacts.

Natural kinds are a class of objects (e.g.

animals, vegetables and minerals) that occur in the

environment without human intervention (Putnam, 1975).
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Artifacts, which are produced by
humans, make up another
large class. How the two classes
differ can be seen in how
they are treated by science^
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). we
observe, discover, and constantly
redefine the division of
the natural kind objects. Large
branches of science, such as
botany, are devoted to discovering
more about natural
kinds,
in contrast, there is no division
of science that is devoted

to discovering more about trash cans
and how they differ from
mailboxes. We humans, as creators of these
artifacts, have
defined the categories by their function.

Medin and Shoben (1988) have shown that
transforming
objects can point out one of the fundamental
differences
between artifacts and natural kinds,

when participants are

presented with a banana and a boomerang that have been
straightened, the banana is still perceived as a banana but
the boomerang is seen as a stick.

This example illustrates

that natural kinds (e.g. animals, plants, minerals) comprise
a domain where only deep, structural changes (genetic

engineering, nuclear fission, etc.) can change their
identity.

Artifacts form another domain where appearance and

features match intended function.

When the features are

Occasionally there are intriguing exceptions within the class of
artifacts, for example: art, computers, cars and other complex
inventions (Keil 1991). These man-made objects seem to defy the simple,
functional descriptions that define most artifacts, and can have fields
of study associated with them.
Despite this, all of the artifacts in
this study are simple (like the mailbox), so the simple division of
artifacts and natural kinds will suffice.
'

7

changed so that the function is
modified or lost, the
artifact has changed.

Keil (1989) used the procedure
of transforming objects
to test if children and adults do
indeed make the distinction
between these two categories,
his study, children from
five to ten years-old were given
pictures of objects, both
natural (animal, vegetable and mineral)
and artifacts, and
were then told a story about how those
objects were changed
with plastic surgery. After seeing a picture
of the

m

transformed object, the children were then asked,
with a
somewhat informal interview, questions about the
object.

Keil found that children of all ages believed the

artifacts to had changed.

different response pattern.

The natural kinds evoked a

Children in Kindergarten tended

to believe that the objects were changed, but fourth-grade

children stated that the animal remained the same, despite
the transformation.

Keil interpreted his findings by

concluding that as children grow older, their understandings
of these transformations are less reliant on the

characteristic perceptual features and more reliant on their
more biological understandings of natural kinds.

8

The Theory Theory

A new model of categorization was
introduced to provide
a second of explanation that can
help explain some of the
limitations of the early, feature-based
models of

categorization.

The Theory Theory, which began in
the

philosophy of science literature (Morton,
1980), postulates
that people have a framework of intuitive
theories
for a

domain of knowledge,

we can partially define these theories

as a "host of mental 'explanations' ... a
complex set of

relations between concepts, usually with a causal
basis"
(Murphy

&

Medin, 1985).

in other words, a framework of

theories provides us with a broad basis for understanding
a
domain of knowledge (e.g. biology), and helps us relate
one

concept to another within that domain (Wellman, 1990).

A

theory underlying a particular concept goes beyond the
exemplars, or features of the exemplars in that concept, and

provides the reason the concept contains those exemplars and
features.

(Gopnik

&

Meltzoff, 1997, Murphy

&

Medin, 1985).

A theory does not, however, need to be explicit or even
available to the conscious mind.

A theory most likely

operates on a sub-conscious level.

The Theory Theory does

not refute the usefulness of models like the prototype or

family resemblance models but provides a second, more

abstract level to the explanation of our ability to

categorize the world we live in.

According to the Theory

Theory view, both features (and/or exemplars) and the
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theoretical explanations for the category
are needed at the
same time. Keil (1994) succinctly
explains this need for two
levels of information.

"Explanations do not amount to much

if they do not have anything to explain,
and raw tabulations

quickly overwhelm any information gathering
system if it does
not partially order that information in terms
of explanatory
usefulness." Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) agree,
comparing

categorization to scientific inquiry by saying we need
both
the hypothesis and the data to fully understand a phenomenon.

How can the Theory Theory explain the facts found by
Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman?

According to this view, a

person's intuitive theory about a category may contain an

explanation for why, within a domain such as mathematics,
categories can have rigid, non-graded membership.

This

explanation might include the information that constructs,
such as odd number, are mathematical definitions that

absolutely constrain the set of possible exemplars,

while

the theory is constraining the membership of the category,

our feature-calculations may still provide a graded
"goodness" judgment when forced.

The difference between natural kinds and artifacts,

illistrated through the transformations performed on them by
Keil (1989) can also be explained by the Theory Theory.

People's naive theories of natural kinds may contain an idea
of an "essence" in natural objects that remains the same
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despite superficial transformations
(Gelman and Hirschfeld,
1997). This essence could tell us that
the banana remains a
banana, even when straightened,
since the theory behind the
identity of a boomerang, as an artifact,
would have
no such

essence associated with it, would allow
for identity changes
by superficial transformations.

To briefly summarize, the Theory Theory
has been able to
offer explanations for differences between
categories.
This

model, as opposed to the earlier models of
categorization,

can explain why a category can either have fixed or
graded
membership.

The Theory Theory can also explain why objects

from artifact categories can be transformed by simply

changing the perceptual features, whereas natural kinds
remain unchanged by these transformations.

Conceptual Change

In his 1989 study, Keil not only found that transformed

artifacts and natural kinds are treated differently, but also
that people's intuitive theories about these transformations
are not the same at different ages.

The present study did

not measure participants' responses longitudinally, so it

cannot directly measure how a theory behind a category or

concept might change over time.

how adults

'

However,

I

will discuss here

theories might have changed with maturity and

experience and therefore differ from those of children.
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concepts, and the theories behind
them, must change as
we learn and age. Carey's
(1985) work with the concept of
alive is an experimental example of a
conceptual change.
Carey (1985) introduced participants to
a novel property;
children were taught that people have spleens,
and adults
were taught that people possessed an omentum
(a membrane in
the abdomen). She then asked them if other
things
(dogs,

bees, worms, flowers, clouds, garlic presses)
had spleens or

omentums.

Children seemed to use the general properties of

animacy and similarity to humans to create their
inferences.
That is, they inferred that all animate objects had a
spleen,
but were less likely to make this inference as the object

became less similar to humans.

The adults attributed an

omentum to an object much more often when the object was a
vertebrate than an invertebrate.

They also seemed to

distinguish between plants and other inanimate objects.
Carey concluded that younger children understand life as
"animacy"

and adults understand it as "living" with sub-

categories for plants, invertebrates, vertebrates and
mammals.

These two frameworks (animacy and living) differ,

but both are used to make inference judgments of this new

property to known objects.

Keil (1989) and Carey (1989) both found that a theory

behind a concept was different at different ages.

Carey's

studies found that while younger children's theory of alive

might have only included animate objects, the theory seems to
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.

develop with age and/or experience
to include the plant
kingdom. The oldest children's
theory of alive also

subdivides alive into sub-classes such
as vertebrates and
invertebrates, it seems that there are
several stages in
understanding the concept "alive." Keil's
studies on

transformations showed that the understanding
of essence goes
through several stages as well. He ran his
transformations
experiment in two ways, with younger children
(two to three

year-olds) the transformation story only said
that the first
object was wearing a costume, and therefore looked
like the

second object.

Keil found that three year-olds could

understand that the essence of the object remained unchanged
in these simple costume changes, but that two year-olds
could
not.

with older children (five to nine year-olds) he used

the deeper transformations that a plastic surgeon can perform
in his stories of change.

As stated above, the five year

olds could not understand that the essence of the object

remained unchanged after the surgery, but the nine year-olds
could.

So costume changes seem to be understood very early

as not truly representing identity changes, but the changes

provided by sugeons take more age and experience to
understand.

These stages in children's theories of animals

and plants, as shown in the studies of the concepts of alive

and essence reflect a ever-growing understanding of natural
kinds

13

Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) provide
an explanation for
how such a conceptual change might
occur. According

to their
view, we come into the world with very
simple theories about
very broad categories, such as animate
vs. non-animate motion
(Spelke, Phillips & woodward, 1995).
Gopnik and Meltzoff
also propose that we are endowed with a drive
to explain the
world by using the simplest theory that will be
able to

predict our environment.

According to this model, a cycle of

conceptual change is started when counterevidence is
encountered.
data.

At first, counterevidence is ignored as noisy

Later, an auxiliary hypothesis may be added to cover

some of these examples.

Finally, as the preponderance of

evidence against the theory builds, the theory can be changed
to replace the old one.

The changes in peoples' intuitive theories might also be

similar to scientific theory development throughout history.

From the vantage point of history, we can see that the
development of a new theory to replace the old might not be
automatic.

Even when the auxiliary hypotheses are becoming

more numerous and cumbersome, no person may have the insight

to develop a new theory.

Also, not everyone who is

introduced to a new theory may accept it.

Scientists

disagreed with Copernicus for many years after he developed
the theory of a heliocentric universe to replace the unwieldy

notion of crystal spheres.

This old hypothesis had many

exceptions and an increasingly complex set of auxiliary
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hypotheses (in the form of spheres
around spheres...) (Kuhn,
1962). Fortunately, we do not have to
replicate the genius
of insight in every new generation,
while historical theory
change might be slow in acceptance,
conceptual theory change
can occur rapidly as a child (or adult)
sees that their
current intuitive theory is inadequate and
finds a

replacement theory by learning from various other
sources
provided by society and experience (Gopnik & Meltzoff,

1997).

Conceptual change would probably most often occur at
a subconscious level; just as theories are not often
conscious,

their change in status would probably not be as well.

How can we measure changes in a theory, when theories
are constructs, possibly even subconscious, within the mind?

One indirect way was used effectively by Keil (1989) in his

transformations study.

Keil simply measured whether the

participants believed the object changed, or believed that it
had stayed the same.

The older children responded

differently to the transformations of natural kinds than to
the transformations of artifacts.

According to the view of

the Theory Theory, this could be due to changes in their

theory of biology.

The younger children treated all the

objects as equally transformed.

This confirmed that

children's understanding of the transformations had changed,
but did not illuminate how they changed.

15

Despite the fact that theories are
usually operating at
an intuitive level, it may be
possible to question the
participants directly about their theories,
while they might
not be able to place the entire theory
into words, they may
be able to offer a richer source of
information about their
theories than their responses to the
transformations would
show, in the course of Keil's experimental
interview,
the

children gave numerous justifications for, and
elaborations
on, their answers. Keil briefly mentions
that, when
confronted with artifact transformations, older
children
tended to refer to function more than appearance.
Unfortunately, no further analysis was done with this rich
source of information.

Therefore, one of the main goals of

the current experiment is to do an a analysis of the

justifications that participants provide for their answers.

Asking the participants to justify their answers should
offer more insight into their theories of natural kinds and
artifacts.

Categorizing their justifications into separate

types of reasoning may also show that perticipants who

mention biological concepts in their justifications might

show a more mature pattern of responding to Keil's
transformation scenarios.

The indirect (transformation

answers) and more direct (justification) measures of the

children's theories should validate each other.

16

The Nat ure of

^^t-.heories"

AS stated above, the Theory Theory
postulates that

intuitive theories are the second level of
explanation behind
a concept.
Until this point, I have been relatively
vague
about the specific information or mechanisms that
a theory
might include, in fact, the study of the structure
and

mechanism of theories has not progressed very far, but
from
the writings of Murphy and Medin (1985), Carey
(1985) and

those of others (Keil, 1989; Gopnik

&

Meltzoff, 1997; Marcus,

1997, in press) we can begin to examine the structure and

function of theories.

Some of the proposed features of a

theory include abstractness

,

causality, coherence and rules.

Abstractness implies that the theory is at a more
removed, abstract level than the features or exemplars in the

categories.

Although both features and theories are

necessary for complete categorization, the theory is separate
from the features (Keil 1994).

An illustration of the

abstract nature of theories can be seen in categories without
graded membership, like odd number (Armstrong, et. al.,
1983).

The Family Resemblance models did not separate graded

membership between categories from graded structure within a
category.

Since, as illustrated above, the category "odd

number" has fixed membership and graded structure, membership

and structure must be separate functions, at least for some

categories.

A theory operating at a removed, more abstract
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level, can remain separate from the
concrete feature

calculation and override these calculations
in the cases of
categories with fixed membership.

Intra-concept coherence is the "glue" that holds
a
particular concept together (Murphy & Medin, 1985).

it is

how the individual parts of a theory behind a category
are
related to each other. For example, it can explain how

the

theory is related to the data, in the case of the graded
structure of the category "odd number", and how the theory
remains separate from the data in the graded membership of
the same category.

Inter-concept coherence tells us how a

particular category is related to other categories within a
larger domain of knowledge (Gopnik

&

Meltzoff, 1997).

"Animal" is a superordinate category, and the category
"monkey" is part of "animal".

This coherence also tells us

that toy monkeys and clouds are not related in the same
fashion.

Finally, because we cannot observe all the relevant

properties of an object during every individual observation
of that object, we need some kind of inference mechanism is

needed to make predictions about new items that we place in
our category (Gopnik

&

Meltzoff, 1997).

Just because a tiger

is not currently eating, does not mean that it is not a

acting as a carnivore at other times.

Inferring that this

tiger is a carnivore, like the other tigers we have witnessed
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eating, gives us much more information
to help us act wisely
around tigers. Inference can also bring
information from the

superordinate level of categories to the basic
level. For
example, knowing that members of the category
of animals
(e.g. tigers, geese) bear offspring, we
can attribute
the

ability to produce offspring to a new animal
species called a
hoatzin, without having to observe a hoatzin giving
birth.

These examples present a type of inference consistent

with previous models of categorization.

This type of

inference involves generalizing a feature from known examples
of a category to new ones.

The only difference between the

two examples is the size of the category within which the

generalization is being made,

in the first instance, we are

generalizing the feature "is carnivorous" to a specific

example of a tiger within the category of tigers.

In the

second, we are generalizing the feature "bears offspring" to
a new species of animal, hoatzin, within the larger category

of animals.

Models of categorization before the Theory

Theory are able to make these inferences, since they involve
features already familiar to the models.

The models only

need to pull up the features associated with a category, and
then generalize the features to the specific example.

Since

these models are entirely feature-based, they can easily
apply the known features to the new instances.
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There is, however, another type of
inference that these
models cannot account for (Marcus, in
press). This inference
involves new features (e.g. bears hoatzin
offspring),
not

just generic, known features (e.g. bears
offspring),

while

it may seem obvious that people can infer
that a hoatzin has

hoatzin babies, two important types of models
cannot predict
this ability. The first type of models that
cannot account
for generalization of new features includes
feature-based

models of categorization.

To illustrate, we turn again to

the case of transformations.

If we know that horses remain horses and have horse

offspring despite being painted to look like zebras, we
should also know that hoatzins remain hoatzins and have

hoatzin offspring despite being altered to look like geese.
Based on the fact that feature-based models are built

entirely out of stored memory representations, Marcus (1997)
has argued that these models cannot infer a new feature.
"... you can't remember that geesabs [a novel animal] have

geesab offspring: you have to infer it." (Marcus 1997,
emphasis original)

p.

6,

Feature-based models are very efficient

at weighing new examples against the other members in a

category, and making a judgment on whether, and how well, the

new example fits the category.

They can also, after

including the new example as a member of the category,
generalize the known properties from the other instances of
the category to the new instance.
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They cannot, however.

infer new features (e.g. a new
type of offspring) to new
examples (e.g. a new species) based on
their category
membership.

A second class of models that cannot predict
that

a new

instance of a category will have an appropriate
new feature,
includes feed-forward neural network models (e.g.
Rumelhart &
Todd, 1993).

of nodes:

These neural networks consist of several layers

Input nodes, output nodes, and one or more layers

of hidden nodes.

These networks start with all the

connections between the nodes randomly assigned a weight, or
strength of connection between two nodes.

The network then

receives an input, which is usually an exemplar that contains
several features which are represented as a distributed

pattern of activation of the input nodes.

For example, an

hoatzin bird might be input to the system by activating nodes
that represent "has wings," "has claws on its wings," "can

climb trees," and so on, but not activating other nodes that
represent "has gills," or "is made of cloth."

The network

then produces output by activating one or more of the output
nodes, and is informed if the output was correct.

Based on

the feedback that the output was correct or incorrect, the

system adjusts the weights of the connections between the
nodes so that the network will be more or less likely to

produce that output on the next trial.

After numerous

experiences with examples which contain features that

represent every input and output node, the network is able to
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correctly weigh the connections between
the nodes and produce
the correct output for a particular
input.

Such a network cannot capture the
hoatzin example.
Imagine that a network has been assigned
the task of
determining which kind of offspring a
particular animal would
have. The input nodes might be the features
of the parent
animal, and the output nodes could be types
of offspring.
This network would have received many examples
of animals and
their offspring, which then would become familiar
to the
system.

One example might be to input the features of a
cat

(claws, fur, etc.) and then the system would select an
output

node that represented the offspring,

if the system was

incorrect, the weights would be readjusted, and the next time

the system received the cat features as input, it would be

more likely to activate the "kitten" node,

it would not,

however, have experienced instances that involve a particular

output node, "hoatzin baby."

Since the system was told that

activating the "hoatzin baby" node was incorrect in all of
the thousands of previous examples, the connection leading to
this node would have a acquired a set of connection weights

such that it tends not to be activated.

Before receiving the

novel hoatzin input, no given input would activate this

unfamiliar output node;

the network would need many examples

of the hoatzin to be familiarized with the novel input and

output to then readjust the connections enough to produce the
novel output.

Therefore, these models are incapable of
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.

producing an output that involves an
unfamiliar node (Marcus,
in press)

What type of mechanism is able to capture
the hoatzin
example, then? The ability to generalize
new features to new
instances of a category requires a
variable-manipulating

mechanism (Marcus, in press).

This mechanism might use a

rule, such as "For all x, Y, such that X is
a member of

species Y, X has offspring of type Y."

m

this case, x would

be a specific instance (Mary) of the unfamiliar
species Y
(hoatzin).

So since Mary is a member of the hoatzin species,

Mary will have offspring of the type hoatzin.

This rule will

not only work when Mary looks like a hoatzin, but also in the

more complex example where Mary has been altered to look like
a goose.

As long as Mary is still included in the category

of hoatzins, the above rule will predict that Mary will have

hoatzin babies.

The use of variables in the rule allows for

the generation of novel features based on the pattern

established by the other examples of the category.

While the categorization and neural network models

described above may be unable to solve a problem that would
involve producing novel output, models that can represent

variables will not have this limitation

(Marcus, in press).

A model such as the LISA model of analogy (Hummel

&

Holyoak,

1997) can represent variables and therefore could solve the

problem posed in the current experiment.
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Any model of

categorization that does not include a
variable
representation system will be unable to
make inferences
requiring novel responses.

Therefore,

l

will test if people use variable

representations within an inference system, by testing

whether or not they infer new properties to unfamiliar
objects, i. e. specifically inferring that hoatzins

have

hoatzin babies (Marcus, 1997).

i

expect that participants

can treat both novel and familiar items equally, and can

predict that hoatzins, altered to look like geese, can have
hoatzin babies.

If these predictions are borne out, the

results found here would provide exceptionally clear evidence
that a rule or variable-manipulating system is being used.
This thesis will show that children and adults can indeed

make these inferences, and therefore argues that models of

categorization must include some kind of inference mechanism
to be able to accurately portray our ability to categorize
the world.

Unlike other models of categorization, the Theory

Theory could easily incorporate this mechanism in the
structure of theories, thereby offering a more complete model
of categorization than has previously been shown.

The Experiment

This experiment utilizes transformation experiments on

natural objects and artifacts (after Keil, 1989) as a
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valuable tool for examining the theory of
natural kinds. The
first goal of this thesis, therefore,
is a simple replication
of Keil's (1989) experiment, in this
experiment, children
and adults were tested using a procedure
very similar
to

Keil's (1989) plastic surgery transformations
of natural
kinds and artifacts, as has been described above,
i

hope to

again show that as children grow older, they have a
better

understanding of the stability of a natural kind through
a
superficial transformation

The second goal of this experiment is to categorize

people's types of reasoning during the process of giving an
answer.

The justifications given by younger children should

reflect reasoning based on surface features, or as Keil

described them, "characteristic features."

As children grow

older, their justifications are expected to reflect their

increasing understanding of the difference between natural
kinds and artifacts by including biological explanations.

The final goal of the experiment is to begin to examine
the structure of theories.

Previous research has shown that

children can attribute novel properties to known animals
(Carey, 1985), and known properties to novel categories based

on the category label (Davidson

&

Gelman, 1990).

These

studies cannot tell us, however, how inference within a

category takes place.

We will ask children to generalize two

known properties to new natural kind objects:
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natural kinds

do not Change when only
perceptually altered; and a natural
kind object will produce offspring
of the same species as
itself. Testing participants
on novel objects will assess
their ability to generalize
variable properties from
a

familiar instance to a new instance
within a domain, if
participants can make these inferences,
especially in regard
to the heredity questions, these
results would be best
explained by a rule or variable system,
similar to the one
stated above, operating as a part of the
participants'
inference mechanism.
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CHAPTER

2

METHOD

Particip ani-g

Participants included 30 children
(15 seven year-olds
and 15 ten year-olds) whose names
were drawn from the birth
records for Hampshire County held by
the Department of
Psychology at the University of Massachusetts.
The average
ages of the two age groups were seven
years, two

months, and

ten years, two months.

These ages were chosen to correspond

roughly to Keil's (1989) groups of second graders
(mean age
seven years, six months) and fourth graders (mean
age nine

years, nine months).

The 15 adult participants were

volunteers from psychology classes at the University of
Massachusetts.

Adult participants received course credit for

their participation.

Interview Procedure

Each session was held in a small lab room at the

University of Massachusetts with the interviewer, the
participant, and, if the participant was a child, his or her
parent(s) present.

The interviewer was an undergraduate

psychology student at the University who received research
credit for her assistance.

The interviewer first explained
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the task to each participant.

Adult participants signed

consent forms, as did the parents
of the participating
children. The interviewer also
asked each child's oral
consent to participate, she then
explained to
the

participant that he or she would be
looking at a series of
objects that would be transformed
by a group of plastic
surgeons. The interviewer finally
proceeded with twelve
story-question scenarios. These twelve
scenarios were
presented in a single, randomized order

to the first half of

the participants and in the reverse order
to the second half.

Each story-question scenario proceeded as
follows:
interviewer presented the first picture in the

The

pair to the

participant and verbally labeled the object,

if the object

in the picture was novel, the interviewer explained
a little

about the object,

she then explained how the object was

transformed by the plastic surgeons, and presented the
picture of the transformed object (the second picture in the
pair).

Finally, with both pictures on the table before the

participant, the interviewer asked the participant a series
of questions to assess the participant's understanding of the

transformed object.

These questions, which resulted in four

different scores (described below under scoring), were always
of the same type, but had minor variations in wording to

maintain the participants' interest in the questions.
Humorous, extraneous questions (e.g.

"Do you think it would

like to watch TV?") were added to put the children at ease
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with the interviewer.

These questions tended to elicit
a

smile, and also allowed the
child to answer an easy question
and avoid any frustration, a novel
item example is given
below; the complete stories and
questions are found in

Appendix A.

This is a Soursop. it's a fruit that
grows in
the Caribbean, a bunch of islands south
of Florida.
It is big, and has a rough skin,
it has lots of
little black seeds inside, and tastes a
little
sour. We, in America, make lemonade out
of sour
tasting lemons and water and sugar, and they
make
drinks out of the soursop that way, too. They also
make ice cream out of the soursop by adding milk,
vanilla, water and sugar.

The doctors took the soursop, and sucked all
the insides out, so the skin shriveled up and got a
little darker. They bleached the seeds so they
were white, and they took most of the sour taste
out of the fruit by soaking it in water for a long
time.

Then, they put everything back in, but the
skin had shrunk, so they could only get half of the

insides back in. it wasn't so round anymore.
they were all done it looked like this.

When

So now that the doctors are all done, and it
looks like this, what kind of plant is it? A
1)

cucumber or a Soursop?
2)

Uh huh, why do you think that?

3)

Do you think it would like to sing?

4)

If you took the seeds, and planted them, what would

grow?

A Soursop plant or a cucumber plant?
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stimuli

The objects presented to the
participants were color
pictures printed on 8 1/2" x 11" white
paper. There were
three types of picture pairs used in the
story-question
scenarios: familiar natural kinds, novel
natural kinds, and

artifacts.

Table

1.

The list of pictures is found in Table

1.

Pairs of stimuli used, grouped by object type.

Type of Object Pair

Original

Transformed
Ob j ect

Familiar Natural Kinds

Obi ect
Horse
Raccoon

Skunk

Potato

Apple

Tiger

Lion

Tazier

Koala

Guitarf ish

Shark

Soursop

Cucumber

Hoatzin

Goose

Soccer Ball

Bowling Ball

Trash Can

Mailbox

Umbrella

Flag

Key

Coin

Novel Natural Kinds

Artifacts

Zebra

The pictures for familiar objects (natural and artifact)

were taken from a commercially available clip-art package,
and altered to insure the pictures within each pair were of

approximately the same size and orientation.
four pairs of familiar natural kinds (horse
- skunk,

tiger

-

Three of the
- zebra,

lion) were taken from Keil (1989).
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raccoon
All

references to altering the behavior
of the animals were
removed from Keil's scripts for
these pairs. The fourth pair
(potato - apple) was an inanimate
natural object,
and was

included to help reduce the variance
in the number of
transformations performed on the objects,
it replaced
another example from Keil, in which a
grapefruit
was

transformed to an orange in only two "steps"
or actions
performed by the plastic surgeons. The
grapefruit was
injected with sugar, and then it was dyed orange,

it was

possible that these two simple steps might make
it more

believable that the object had not changed, compared
with the
four steps in the tazier - koala script. Keil's
grapefruit orange pair was replaced by the potato

-

apple pair, allowing

every pair in this experiment to be transformed in three to
five verbal "steps."

Keil's (1989) original artifact pairs were also not used
in this study because of limitations in the available
artv/ork.

Keil's artifact pairs (e.g. coffeepot

feeder) were hand-drawn illustrations;

-

bird

the artist could

ensure that the first and last object looked similar.

The

available clip-art pictures showed large differences in the
shapes of the two objects.

As a consequence, Keil's artifact

pairs would have been much more visually different from each

other than the natural item pairs.

To reduce this

difference, other artifacts were selected so that (as judged
by the author) the pictures within a pair had approximately
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the same perceptual similarity
as the pairs of novel and
familiar natural kinds.

Creating novel items from a given
clip-art database
presented a unique challenge, especially
since adults

and

school-age children are familiar with many
animals. The
novel natural items were originally
mythical-looking animals

created with a computer by assembling a collage
of parts from
other clip-art objects, when these pictures
were presented
to a child in pilot testing, his or her first
reaction was
"That's not real!" Children may not have been including

the

unrealistic novel animal in their category of animals, and
if
so, would have no reason to generalize their knowledge
from

familiar animals to such unnatural stimuli.

To avoid the children's rejection of the objects as part
of their categories of animals and plants, the novel natural

kinds used in the experiment were selected because they were
real but obscure items, and probably unfamiliar to the

participants.

The soursop is a rare island fruit, and its

picture was found in a Caribbean cookbook (Sookia, 1994).
The guitarfish, a member of the stingray family, was

photographed for a Caribbean reef fish identification book
(Humann, 1989)

The tarsier^ (which was inadvertently

^ This
animal was presented to all subjects as a tazier. At the
end of the experiment, an error was discovered in copying the material
from the source book, resulting in the mislabeling of the object. For
the sake of consistency with the experimental materials, this animal
will be referred to as a tazier within this thesis.
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mislabeled in the scripts as a tazier)
and hoatzin were found
in a educational book on life found
in jungles
(Richards,

The tarsier is a small animal, similar
to a bush
baby, that lives in the trees of tropical
rain forests, and
the hoatzin is a bird that inhabits the
canopy of the rain
forest. Stimuli for these novel objects were
generated by
using a computer drawing program to alter clip
art pictures
so they would closely match the photographs of
the actual
1970).

objects.

Post-test questioning in piloting assured us that

the children believed the obscure plant and animals
were
real, and that the children were indeed unfamiliar with
the

objects.

Half -size, black and white copies of all pictures

are reprinted in Appendix B.

The novel items were not transformed into different
novel natural kinds, to parallel the other transformations
for familiar natural kinds and artifacts.

Instead, novel

natural items were transformed into familiar natural items.
This pairing hopefully constituted the strongest test of the

participant's theory of the identity of the novel animals.

Participants should know much more about the familiar object

than the novel object.

If the participants were biased to

respond on the basis of familiarity with the object, they
could be expected to have the most difficulty saying the

object was still really the first, unfamiliar object.
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Suqqestibil ity

in the process of designing a
script format,

interviewers found it easy to lead a
participant to the
"correct" answer, especially when the
participant was a
child. This issue touches on the
suggestibility of children,

which has been investigated in psychology
and has
implications for child witnesses in our legal
system. Ceci
and Bruck (1993) reviewed eighteen studies of
suggestibility
and found that preschool children (even up to
age
six) are

the most susceptible to suggestion, but that
suggestion can

also bias answers from older children to a smaller extent.
Also, children will occasionally lie when they are motivated

to do so.
study.

This fact has serious implications for the current

If children could be properly motivated to lie about

something they knew, it might be much easier to influence
their answer for a question about which they were unsure.

Another area of concern was that our interviewer was

unfamiliar to the children, and that fact might further
motivate the children's suggestibility.

Goodman and her

colleagues (Goodman, et. al. 1995) investigated familiarity
and bias as two factors that could influence recall.

Four

year-olds participated in play with a research assistant, and
were then interviewed about the play session.

They were

interviewed by either their own mothers or by another mother.
Also, half of the interviewers were told biased assumptions
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about the play session prior to the
interview.

They found

that, especially during a free interview,
children made the

most errors in recall when questioned by
a biased, unfamiliar
interviewer. The children's own mothers elicited
the best

recall, regardless of their bias.

Biased interviewers also

questioned misinformation given by the children more
strongly, and were less accurate in describing what they

believed to have occurred during the play session.

Since half of our children were only slightly older than

pre-school age, and they would be interviewed by an

unfamiliar assistant, several steps were taken to minimize
the possibility of suggestibility in the questioning:

The

interviewer was blind to the hypotheses of the experiment and
was instructed not to try to help the child in any way.
Also, the interviewer was given a strict script to follow.

She was only allowed to add

(a)

Uh-huh's or OK's to make sure

the child knew the experimenter was still interested, and

(b)

restatements of portions of the script to answer children's

questions about the transformations.

Finally, the same

number of questions were asked during the natural and
artifact transformation scenarios.

In contrast to these precautions, Keil's (1989)

interview format was open-ended and run by an assistant
familiar with the hypotheses of the experiment.

Also, in the

few transcripts provided as examples, interviews during
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natural object scenarios tended to
be longer than interviews
about artifact scenarios. These
differences may have caused
children to reevaluate their answers
more often for natural
items than for artifacts, leading
them,
in effect, to the

"correct" answer.

Despite these large differences in the

interview format, we predicted that
Keil's findings would
still be present in an unbiased setting.

Scoring

Initial Judgment Score

Assistants scored the first statement given by the child
in response to "What kind of

is it, a

?"

or a

In accordance with Keil's (1989) scoring procedure, a score

of

1

meant that the child believed the object to be changed.

Scores of

3

meant that she believed the object to remain

essentially unchanged on the inside.

Scores of

meant she

2

was wavering, or was genuinely unsure about the current state
of the object.

A score of

3

also included all answers of the

sort - "Well, it looks like the transformed animal, but

really is the original animal."

Using the soursop

pair as an illustration, the answers were coded
the response was "cucumber" and
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3

for "soursop."

1

-

cucumber

for when

.

Final Judgment Snnro

in pilot testing for this
experiment, children seemed to
be biased to quickly name the
transformed object in response

to "What kind of

is it 1"

It was possible that their

first answer did not adequately
represent their understanding
of the transformed object. Therefore,
the entire transcript
of the scenario was examined for changes
in the participants'
judgments. Participants often changed their
mind in response
to the justification question (described below),
a typical
example from an adult was:
E.:

What kind of animal is it?

S

A koala.

.

:

E.:

Why do you think that?

S.:

Well, she looks like a koala, but she's probably a

tazier

The final judgment score used the same scale as was used for

the initial judgment score.

For illustration, the above

example shows an initial score of
but a final score of

3

1

(for the changed animal),

(for the original animal).

judgment score may be more representative of the

participant's understanding of the transformation.
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The final

Offspring Score

A third score, the offspring score, was
based on the
response to the question, "What kind of
babies

will it have?"

Answers here were coded to parallel the
scores in the initial
and final judgment scores. A score of 1
was given when the

participant believed the offspring would be the
same kind as
the transformed object. A score of 3 was given
when he or
she believed the offspring would be like the
original object,

and a score of

2

was again for unsure answers.

Thus, if a

raccoon was transformed into a skunk, and a participant said
that the animal would now have skunk babies, the score was a
1.

If he said the animal would have raccoon babies, the

score was

3.

Justif icat ions

The second question asked of the participants was, "Why

do you think that?" or "Why isn't it a
pair, not named by the participant)?"

(object in the

The responses can be

considered justifications of their answers to the judgment
question.

These justifications were categorized (post-hoc)

into thirteen varieties and then lumped more broadly into

three major explanatory groupings (see Table 2). The groups
of justification types represent three types of reasoning:

perceptual, behavioral /functional, and biological.
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Table 2. List of justifications,
reasoning and listed in order of grouped bv tvoe of
'dIcreLing frequency
^* The
examples are taken from the experimental
slssions

NAME

DEFINITION

EXAMPLE

Perceptual
Features

Lists one or more features.

Whole

Cites the perception of the
whole object.

"Because that looks like a
koala, not a tazier"

Definition

Cites a feature or whole
object as defining

"Because horses don't have
stripes

Told

Cites interviewer's
definitions.

"Because you told me so."

Behavioral

/Functional

Transform

Cites the transformation.

"Because [the zebra] is
black and white."

.

"

'Cause they.

everything

.

.changed

.

Function

Explains the function for a
particular feature.

"[It's a mailbox] because
you put things in it... and
those are things you need."

Subj

Explains their behavior or
reactions

"[The shark] looks meaner
now

Behavior

Explains how the animal
would now behave.

"[It's a goose] because it
doesn't climb trees [like a
hoatzin], it just flies,"

Family

One adult used this
comment, difficult to
categorize.

"A horse is in the same
family as a zebra, so it
could be changed."

'

Behavior

.

Biological
Looks/Is

The object looks like
but really is Y.

Final

You can change an artifact
easily, but not a natural
object

"It's easier to change a
ball than the internal
structure of an animal to
something else.

Out /In

The outside is changed but
the insides remain the same

"It's not a zebra 'cause
[they didn't] change like
anything internal ..."

Parts

The parts are the same,
just the configuration is
different

"It's made out of everything
that was in the original
one

X,
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"It's still a guitarfish, it
just looks like a shark."

.

The perceptual and biological
types of reasoning were
identified first, and they parallel
the scoring system used
on the judgment scores. The
perceptual category, was
hypothesized to closely match Keil's
description of the
children's answers to "What is it now?"
that resulted in a

score of

1

in his experiment.

Keil believed a score of

1

As stated in the introduction,

meant the child was being led by

the characteristic perceptual features.

The biological

category was hypothesized to closely match Keil's
description
of the children's answers to "what is it now?" that
were
scored as a

3.

A score of

3

meant (for Keil) that the child

was overriding the features with non-perceptual explanations
or essences.

The behavioral /functional category, evolved from an

examination of the answers that did not fit in the perceptual
or biological categories.

These answers refer to properties

not visible in the picture, but are also not as essential to

the objects as biology or DNA.

Participants often did not limit themselves to only one
of the thirteen different varieties of justifications when

responding.

The coder recorded every justification that was

given by the participant, but within a transformation

scenario each individual variety was only recorded once.
illustrate the scoring procedure, consider the following
answer given by a participant: "That's the koala... that's
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To

what it looks like(a), it's got its
ears, small eyes, and
claws(b), and climbs trees(c)." This

answer was scored as

having three separate varieties of
justification
percept, b = features, and c = behavior).

(a =

whole

The fact that

three separate features were mentioned
was not recorded as
three instances of the "features"
justification.
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3

RESULTS

Preliminary Analy sps

Two independent assistants coded 31
(68%) of the 45
participants on the initial judgment, final
judgment and
offspring score. The scores given by the two
coders agreed
98.0 percent overall, with 98.7% agreement on the
initial
score, 97.3% on the offspring score, and 98.0% on
the final

score.

If any discrepancies occurred in the scoring of
these

31 participants, the scores given by the two coders were then

averaged.

Just one of the assistants scored the remaining 14

participants.

He also was the sole coder for all

justifications

A

between (order, forward or reverse) by

2

3

within

(type of object: familiar, novel or artifact) ANOVA was run

on the initial judgment score to test for order of

presentation effects.

There was no significant effect of

order (F(l,43) = .58, p = .45) and no significant interaction
(F(2,86) = .44,

p=

the type of items.

.64) between order of presentation and

The same type of ANOVA was run on the

offspring score (there were only two types of objects in this
score:

familiar and novel natural kinds).

Neither main

effects of order (F(l,43) = .16, p = .69) nor interactions
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with item type (F(1,43) = 1.8,
p = .19) were significant.
Since there were no order of

presentation effects, the data

for the two different orders of
presentation were combined
for all subsequent analyses.

Initial Ju dgment Scnrta

The mean initial judgment scores for
seven year-olds,

ten year-olds, and adults are depicted in
Figure

1.

On their

initial judgments, the youngest children treated
all items

nearly identically.
(hereafter,

f am)

,

Their mean familiar natural kinds score

mean novel natural kinds score (hereafter,

nov), and mean artifacts score (hereafter, art) were
all 1.0.

The ten year-olds' responses reflected more variability in

responding, where their fam was 1.35 and nov was 1.27, but
art remained near one (1.02).

The data from adults was

similar to the date from ten year-olds.
and 1.5, but art was again 1.0.

Fam and nov were 1.6

This data shows an

increasing separation, as a function of age, in the scores of
the natural items, both familiar and novel, from the artifact
scores
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3

0)

7

Y. 0.

1

Figure 1. Initial judgment
first answer given to "What
the object has changed, 2 =
judgment that the object is
trans formation

A

3

between (age) by

2

0

Y. 0.

Adult

score.

This score represents the
1 = judgment that
indecision in judgment, and 3 =
still the same as before the
is it now?"

within (type: familiar or

artifact) ANOVA was run on the initial judgment score.

The

main effect of the type of object presented was significant
(F(l,42) = 13.61, p = .0006).

The main effect for age was

not significant (F(2,42) = 3.18, p = .05), but this analysis

includes the performance on artifact items, which did not

change with age.

There was a significant interaction of kind

and age (F(2,42) = 3.51, p = .04).

This interaction

replicates Keil's (1989) finding that younger children

respond similarly to the two types of objects, and that older
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children's and adults' responses show
a differentiation
between the types of objects.

A second analysis of the initial judgment
score was
carried out to test whether the participants

were treating

familiar and novel natural kinds similarly.
(age) by

A

3

between

within (type, familiar or novel) ANOVA found
a
significant increase in the scores due to age (F(2,42) =
2

3.77, p = .03).

Although the mean score for familiar natural

items was higher than for the novel natural items this

difference fell just short of significance (F(l,42) =
3.66, p
= .062). There was no interaction effect of novelty with age
(F(2,42) = .25, p = .77).

The lack of a novelty main effect

is probably due to a restriction in the range of scores,

since this experiment most of the scores were I's, and the

means are very low.

it is also possible that no real

differences exist between the performance on the novel and
familiar natural items.

Final Judgment Score

The analysis of the final judgment score presented

another challenge.

All of the participants finally decided

that all artifact items had changed;
in all 180 scores.

there was no variation

Due to this obvious floor effect (or

ceiling effect, since the lowest score is the expected
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answer), there was no variance on which
to base an ANOVA that
included the artifact items.

The data from the initial and final judgment
scores

present the same picture.

The youngest group did not respond

differentially to the three item types as can be seen
in
Figure 2 (fam was 1.02, nov was 1.02, art was 1.00).
in

contrast, older participants again differentiated
between

natural objects and artifacts.

Ten year-olds showed small

differences between their natural (fam = 1.35, nov 1.33) and
artifact (art = 1.00) scores, while the differences were
larger in the adult group (fam = 1.78, nov = 1.68, art =
1.00)

The similarity between the initial and final judgment

scores is evident in the number of transformation scenarios

where subjects changed their minds.

To calculate this, the

number of questions that received different scores for the
initial and final judgments were counted.

If a subject's

responses were coded by two assistants, each coder's scores

were calculated separately and then averaged.

Seven year-

olds received different initial and final judgment scores

only
time.

2

times (out of a possible 180) or 1.1 percent of the

Ten year-olds received different scores

2.8 %, and adults 9.5 times, or 5.3 %.

5

times, or

Most of the data from

adults resulted from one participant who consistently (seven
times) replied that the natural object really had changed,
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but when replying to the offspring
question stated that it
was still really the first object.
Even including this one
participant, subjects only changed their
minds 3.1 percent of
the time, resulting in highly similar
initial and final
judgment scores.

3

I

-r

2.5

-O— Novel

<^

3

Natural Kinds

4-»

Q.

-—Familiar Natural Kinds

U
Q)

a

tA— Artifacts

4-1
(/>

'w5

a>

^
'E
<

1.5

7Y. 0.

TOY. 0.

Adult

Figure 2. Final judgment score. The final score re-codes
the participant's judgment, accounting for any changes in the
participants answers
'

A

3

between (age) by

2

within (type: familiar or novel)

showed a main effect of age (F(2,42) = 5.31, p = .009) and no

effects for novelty (F(l,42) = 1.71,

with novelty and age.

p=

.20) or interactions

(F(2,42) = 1.71, p = .19).
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These

.

results are consistent with those found
in the initial
judgment score. The novelty effect was
not even marginally

significant here, however. Participants did
not treat the
novel and familiar natural objects differently.

Offspring Score

The offspring scores are found in the familiar and
novel

natural kinds scenarios only.

Figure

3

shows that the mean

for both types of items increased as a function of age.

This

increase was also found for familiar and novel natural items
in the initial and final judgment scores.

However, the

offspring question produced higher scores overall than the
previous two scores.

Seven year-olds were again the lowest

scorers, but their mean responses were not near one for the

first time
as expected

(

f am
(

= 1.48, nov = 1.45).

f am

= 2.27, nov = 2.14).

Adults scored higher,
Ten year-old children

scored between these two, but it is also interesting that

their novel scenario mean (1.79) is higher than their

familiar scenario mean (1.73).

This is different from the

previous two (initial and final judgment) scores, where all
age groups scored higher on the familiar items than the novel
items
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Figure 3. Offspring score. This score represents answers to
"What kind of babies will it have?" 1 = the baby was judged
to be the same kind as the changed object, 2 = the
participant was unsure, 3 = the baby was judged to be the
same kind as the original object.

A

3

between (age) by

2

within (type: familiar or novel)

ANOVA showed a nearly significant effect of age (F(2,42) =
3.01, p = .06).

The fact that responses to the offspring

question did not significantly increase as a function of age
was unexpected.

It is possible, however, that participants

of all ages better understand the biology involved in

procreation, increasing scores at all age levels for this
question.
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As in the initial and final judgment
scores, there was
no interaction effect for novelty and age
(F(2,42) =

2.36, p

= .11).

However, unlike the initial score, a main
effect for

novelty fell far short of significance (F(l,42) =
.30, p =
.59). The lack of an effect for novelty replicates the
findings from the final judgment score analysis.

Furthermore, as stated above, the novel score was higher than
the familiar score for the ten year-olds.

The fact that

these two scores could change their ordinal relationship to

each other further suggests that there are no overall effects
of novelty, even accounting for the restricted range of

scores found in this experiment.

Participants used

information from their knowledge of familiar natural items on
nearly all the novel items.

Justifications

Frequency Count

Three analyses were carried out on the justifications

participants had provided for their responses to the

transformation scenarios.

First, a simple tabulation of the

frequencies of the justifications, as a function of age, is

given in Table

3.

Older participants might have been

expected to give more varied answers because of their greater
verbal skills.

However, the total number of different
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varieties of justifications did not vary with
age. Both the
seven and ten year-olds gave a total of 210
different
justifications in the experiment, and adults gave
only
slightly more (220).

Table 3. Simple frequency count of all justifications
given,
summed over trial type.
Perceptual
Features
Whole
Definition
Told
Perceptual
Sub-Totals

Seven Y. 0.

Ten Y. 0.

Adults

Sub-totals

127
38

113
25

68
50

J wo

3
0

2
0

0

5

1

1

168

140

119

427

Funct /Behav.
Transform
Function
Subj s Behave
Behave
Family
Funct /Behav.
Sub-Totals

Seven Y. 0.

Ten Y. 0.

Adults

Sub-Totals

35

34

3

110
20

0
0

7
3
2
0

41
10
0
3

6
5

1

1

41

46

55

142

Biological
Looks /Is
Final
Out /In
Parts
Biological
Sub-Totals
All Types
Sub-Totals

Seven Y. 0.

Ten Y. 0.

Adults

Sub-Totals

1

13

28

0
0
0

8
2

5
9

42
13

1

4

5

1

24

46

71

210

210

220

TOTAL 640

.

'

.

3

1 X
1 O
1
X

11

GRAND

Individual Justification Type Analyses

To further analyze the justifications, the data had to
be transformed since a participant often responded with more
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than one type of justification within one
transformation
scenario. To eliminate problems with having
different
numbers of answers per question, the
justifications were
collapsed so that each subject was given perceptual

scores,

functional /behavioral scores, and biological scores.
score was calculated in the following manner.

Each

A participant

scored one "point" for each transformation scenario
where he
or she had provided a justification from that type.

These

"points" were summed within each transformation scenario type
(familiar, novel and artifact).

This summing resulted in

three scores that ranged from zero to four.

An example from

the familiar natural kinds will illustrate this data

consolidation.

One child answered with both features

(perceptual) and transformation (functional/ behavioral)

justifications on one question, just the transformation
(functional/ behavioral) justification on a second scenario
and the looks/is (biological) justification on the final two

scenarios.

Thus the participant's responses resulted in a

perceptual score of

a functional /behavioral score of

1,

a biological score of

2

2

and

for the familiar natural kinds.

Perceptual scores, as illustrated in Figure

4,

did not

seem to vary as a function of the type of scenario.

These

scores were the types of justifications that encoded

perceptual information, and perception was equally accessible
for all objects.

They did, however, slightly decrease as a

function of age.

For example, familiar natural kinds
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averaged 3.4 questions answered with a
perceptual
justification for seven year-olds, 3.1 questions
for ten
year-olds, and 2.3 questions for adults. A
3 between (age)
by 3 within (type of scenario) ANOVA
showed only a

significant main effect for age (F(2,42) =
3.229, p = .05).

4

T

3.5

--

c
> c

3 --

°>~

S S 2.5
0)
3
O
Vt

s-

_™

-I-

C.

0 ^
k-

Q.

1

— Novel

S

-O

-D— Famliar Natural
-A— Artifacts

1 «

1 ^

Natural Kinds

1

Kinds

0.5

0
7

Y. 0.

10

Y. 0.

Adult

Figure 4. Perceptual justifications score. Each score was
the number of scenarios where participants gave perceptual
types of justifications. Maximum score = 4 in each category.
As can be seen in Figure

5,

functional /behavioral scores

showed a very different pattern than the perceptual scores.

There was no obvious age trend for the natural kinds of
items.

The mean for familiar natural kinds answered with

functional or behavioral justifications, for example, was 0.6
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questions in seven year-olds, 0.8 questions for
ten yearolds, and 0.67 for adults. Artifacts, on
the other

hand, do

show an increasing age trend, where the seven
year olds' mean
was 1.13, and the adults' mean was 1.93. A 3 X 3
ANOVA found
that the only significant effect was the main effect
for type
of scenario (F(2,84) = 15.132, p < .0005),
4
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Figure 5. Functional and behavioral justifications score
Each score was the number of scenarios where participants
gave functional or behavioral types of justifications.
Maximum score = 4 in each category.
Biological justifications would be less relevant to the

artifact scenarios than the natural kinds scenarios, and they
All means

seem to be the most mature level of explanation.
for biological scores are illustrated in Figure

There

6.

was, as in the initial and final judgment scores, an
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increasing separation between artifact and natural
scores as
a function of age. Seven year-olds answered
no familiar
natural kinds or artifacts questions with biological
types of
justifications and only averaged 0.07 questions on novel
natural kinds.

The mean for adults, on the other hand, was

0.27 artifacts questions answered with biological

justifications, and 1.27 and 1.33 questions on novel and

familiar natural scenarios, respectively.

Again, a

ANOVA was carried out on the biological scores.

3

x 3

Unlike the

perceptual and functional /behavioral scores, all effects were
significant:

main effect of age (F(2,42) = 9.807, p = .031),

main effect of scenario type (F(2,84) = 12.418, p < .0005)
and interaction of age and type (F(4,84) = 4.774, p = .002).
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Figure 6. Biological justifications score. Each score was
the number of scenarios where participants gave biological
types of justifications. Maximum score = 4 in each category.

Each of the justifications scores reveals a story

consistent with the data found in the judgment scores.
Perceptual justifications simply decrease as a function of
age.

They are available to participants of all ages and are

also the most common types found in all ages.

However, these

justifications decline in frequency with age and are replaced

with functional justifications for artifacts and biological
justifications for both types of natural items.

Functional /behavioral scores are indeed valid as a

separate designation, especially in the artifact scenarios.

56

.

While the mean judgment scores
on artifact scenarios remain
stable as a function of age, the
functional /behavioral
justifications in these scenarios become
more frequent with
age. The functional/behavioral
justifications seem to

provide a richer source of information by
which to analyze
the data from the artifact scenarios. The

fact that older

participants responded more frequently with these
functional
justifications may indicate that functional
justifications

represent a higher level of reasoning than the
perceptual
justifications used by younger participants.

Biological justifications mirror the initial and final
judgment scores.

Biological reasoning on natural items is

more frequent in older participants for both the familiar and
novel kinds, but not for the artifact scenarios.

This high

degree of similarity is to be expected, since the biological
justifications category was designed to mirror the examples

given by the participants in Keil's experiment who received
scores of three.

In both the judgment scores and the

justifications, more biological reasoning gives higher
scores

Correlating Justifications and Judgments

A final analysis of the justification scores verifies
that the perceptual and biological justifications correspond

to judgment scores of one and three, as they were designed to
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do.

Four Pearson R correlations
compared participants'
scores on the initial and final
judgments with the number of
natural item questions answered with
perceptual or biological
justifications

Participants' initial judgment score and
their
perceptual justifications score showed a
strong negative
correlation (r = -.89). a strong negative
correlation was
also found between the final judgments and
perceptual scores
(-.93). These correlations could also be seen as a
strong

positive correlation between the participants' likelihood
of
choosing the transformed animal as what it is now, and
the

number of perceptual justifications they gave.

The correlations between the biological justifications

score and the judgment scores show the opposite pattern, as
expected.

Initial judgments correlated highly positively

with biological scores
(r = .94).

(r =

.95) as did final judgment scores

These positive correlations mean that if

participants chose the original animal in their judgments,
they were extremely likely to give biological justifications
for their answers.

The previous correlations were highly predictable, but

comparing the justification scores with offspring scores
provides an interesting and unexpected picture.

Figure

graphically represents the data for correlation between
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perceptual justifications score and offspring score
(each
diamond may represent more than one data point). The

correlation between the perceptual scores and offspring
scores is not as strong, but is in the same direction
as the

correlations with the judgment scores (r = -.66).

Figure

7

shows that the reason for the reduction in the strength of

the correlation is that there are data points located in the

upper right of the graph.

t3

3
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2

2

2

I'
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4

14
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0

8

Number

of natural scenarios given
perceptual justifications

Relationship between perceptual justifications and
Figure 7
scores.
If a diamond represents more than one data
offspring
data points it represents is given
of
point, the number
of the diamond.
right
immediately to the
.

The correlation between biological scores and offspring

scores is again not as strong as, but in the same direction
as, the correlation with the judgment scores (r = .66).
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Figure

shows this positive correlation,
and again the
points may represent more than one item
in the data. The
reason for the smaller strength of this
correlation is very
different, it stems from the fact that
the number of
8

biological justifications given by participants
was very low,
and therefore most of the data is clustered
in the bottom
left corner of Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Relationship between biological justifications and
offspring scores. If a diamond represents more than one data
point, the number of data points it represents is given to
the right of the diamond.

When comparing these two graphs, it seems that
participants were able to correctly answer the offspring

question while still giving perceptual justifications for
their judgments of the current identity of the object.
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The

reverse was not true for the biological
justifications,

if a

participant could use biological justifications
for his
answers, he would then be able to come up
with the correct
answer for the offspring question.

A few subjects seemed to be in an intermediate stage
of
understanding about the implications of these
transformations.

Three seven- year-olds, one ten-year-old,

and four adults consistently answered with the changed animal
for judgment questions and with the original animal for

offspring questions, while other participants echoed this
trend less consistently.

The eight participants who

consistently answered in this pattern also gave high levels
of perceptual justifications.

Their mean combined natural

items perceptual score was 6.6, and four of these

participants gave perceptual justifications in all eight
natural scenarios.

In contrast, the mean for the number of

natural scenarios answered with biological justifications for

these eight was less than one.

These participants, along

with others who showed this trend to a lesser degree, make up
the outlying data points in Figure

7,

while not straying from

an ideal 1.0 correlation line in Figure
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DISCUSSION

AS Stated earlier, there were three
goals to this
thesis. The first was to replicate
Keil's (1989)

transformation study.

The second was to show that examining

justifications can more effectively measure the
types of
intuitive theories people might use in categorization.

The

final goal was to show that children and adults
can

generalize what they know from other objects within a

category to make inferences about what variable properties a

new member of the category might have.

Replication of Keil (1989)

The first goal was only partially met.

pattern of findings was replicated.

Keil's basic

Younger children treated

artifacts and natural kinds equally, and older children and
adults started to differentiate their answers based on this

category difference.

The main limitation in this replication

of Keil's work is that Keil's mean scores were much higher

than the ones reported here.

The means Keil reported have

been estimated from his graphs and placed in Table

4

.

As a

comparison, Keil's fourth graders' mean score on natural
kinds was about 2.8, but the ten year-olds in the present

study had mean scores of only 1.35.
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This large difference in

mean scores does not, however,
eliminate the replication of
the effects originally found by
Keil.

^'

study

^""""^^ estimated from Keil's
(1989) transformations

Grade (Mean Age)

Biological Kinds Mean

Artifacts Mean

Kindergarten (5:8)

1.75

1.4

Second Grade (7:6)

2.5

1.2

Fourth Grade (9:9)

2.8

1.3

What could cause this large difference in the range of
scores between this study and Keil's?

One explanation lies

in the fact that maintaining genetic heritage despite

perceptual transformation may be a more suitable measure of
biological understanding than maintaining identity.

The

scores obtained in this experiment for the offspring question
are more similar to those reported by Keil.

reports that "several kindergartners

,

Keil also

though ultimately

deciding that kind membership was changed, were nonetheless
troubled that the transformed animals had babies of the
original kind of animal

.

...

They therefore may have had

some inkling that the type of baby matters, but not enough to

override the salient characteristic features."

(Keil, 1989)

The offspring question seems much more valid and pivotal in

understanding biological essences.
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The individual data from participants
in this study also
support the offspring question as a
better measure of
biological understanding. As stated
earlier, at least eight
participants believed that a transformed
animal could be one
kind of object and have a baby of the
other kind. These
participants seemed to have no hesitation in
generating these
conflicting answers. Their theory of
transformations and

biology allowed both of these answers simultaneously.

Another possibility for the difference in responses

between this study and Keil's original experiment, is that
Keil's experiment had a flexible interview format, with
numerous challenges to the children's thinking.

The

interviewers asked not only, "What is it now?" and, "Why do
you say that?" but also asked "Even though" questions that
further challenged their thinking.

Beyond even that, the

interviewer frequently told the children directly what kind
of babies an animal would have, and what kind of parents it
had.

Our study left the question of offspring for the

participants to answer.

In pilot testing for the current experiment, a more

flexible interview format was used.

This interview was

similar to Keil's; there were more challenges to the

children's thinking, and the interviewer was possibly biased
to influence the responses, since she was the author.
is no direct evidence of bias, however.
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There

The many different

methods attempted in piloting make
it difficult to directly
compare the pilot data with the current
data.

However, the

single judgment score was in general
higher than the means
obtained in the current experiment for
the initial and final
judgment scores, since most of the items
were the same in
the pilot and actual experiments, these
differences
in

interview format seem the likely cause for any
differences
between the means reported in this thesis and those
reported
by Keil.

What in the format difference might have contributed to
the differences between the responses in the two experiments?
I

believe that differences in interview format had two

effects.

First of all, Keil's free-form, challenging

interview forced the participants to think deeply about the
question during the interview.

No simple answer went

unchallenged, and the participants had to more fully explain

their understanding of the transformation.

Secondly, the

free- form interview format and the informed interviewer may

possibly have led the participants to give the expected

pattern of responses.

By not allowing participants to rest

on any simple answer, the challenging interview format may

have led the participants to believe that their first answer

was false and that they should reexamine and consider a

change in their answer.

Also, biased interviewers can lead

children to inaccurate recall of experienced events (Goodman,
et. al., 1995).
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The next procedural step is to try
to encourage deep
contemplation of the questions while
still insuring that the
experimenter is not leading the participants
to the right
answer. There are several possible
methods that might

produce these ideal conditions

.

The interviewer might have

the children listen to a puppet make
mistakes in answering
the questions, and then judge whether or
not the puppet was
correct. The children would first be informed
that the

puppet is from the moon and is often wrong about earth
questions.

This procedure has been used successfully by

linguists who have found that younger children can correct

puppets who are making mistakes that they themselves had

produced in a language elicitation task (Hiramatsu

&

Lillo-

Martin, 1998).

Another possible method (which might be more appropriate
for the older children and adults) is to try to challenge the

participants to think deeply about their answers within a
fixed script format.

This challenge could be accomplished by

designing a set of follow-up questions that are arranged in a
tree-diagram.

Each response could then be specifically

challenged with a "even though..." question.

For example, in

the raccoon to skunk scenario, if the participant responded

that the object was a skunk, the experimenter could reply,
"So, even though the animal used to be brown with black

stripes on its tail, you think it is a skunk?"
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Or, if they

responded that it was still a raccoon,
the reply could be,
"So, even though the animal now
smells
like a skunk, you

still think it's a raccoon?"

This method seems to be the

most likely to challenge subjects of
all ages to deeply
consider their answers, and yet it still
retains the unbiased
structure of a strict script format.

Analysis of Justifications

The second goal of the experiment met with success,

in

accordance with their design, the perceptual justifications

corresponded to the response that the animal had changed
during the transformation, and the biological justifications
corresponded to the opposite response.

The justification

scores and the judgment scores are certainly not independent,
and should not be.

The importance of these types of

justifications lies in the fact that it can show a more

complete picture of the participants
natural kinds and objects.

'

intuitive theory of

As stated in the introduction,

Keil mentions that functional justifications seem to be more

evident at later ages for artifacts, but he stops his
analysis there.

The current experiment successfully

replicated that brief comment with a full analysis.

Justification levels also produced a more complete

picture of the participants who answered that the object was
changed, but the offspring wouldn't be.
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The fact that these

participants usually used perceptual
justifications
reinforces the idea that they are in
an intermediate level of
understanding concerning these transformations.

Inference Within Cateaorips using RuI^r or
Variables

In regard to the third goal, there were
several possible

outcomes for the subject's responses to the novel
objects.
The first outcome is that no participant would
be
able to

generalize what she know about natural kinds to the new
natural objects.

This outcome, of course, is not what we

would predict based on intuition.

However, all models of

categorization before the Theory Theory would predict this
outcome.

As stated earlier, Marcus (1997; in press) has

argued that these models have no mechanism for dealing with

inferring new properties (hoatzin babies) to new objects
(hoatzins) within known categories (animals).

The second possible outcome is that all participants

would treat the novel exactly the same as the familiar.
There would then be no differences in their answers to
familiar and novel natural objects.

Once children and adults

have included the object into a category, they would be able
to generalize properties to all members of the category
equally.

This outcome would show that the inference

mechanism for the theory of
to a rule.

a category was something similar

The children would just substitute one
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instantiation of a variable (or exemplar of a
category) for
another in the rule (Marcus, 1997).

The evidence from this experiment would seem to
support
the second possibility. There were large differences
between
the older participants' responses to novel items and
the
artifacts, but no significant differences were found between

the novel and familiar natural kind items on any of the

measures.

The only possible problem with this evidence is

the restriction in the range of answers,

if the range were

larger, would the small difference between novel and familiar

on the initial judgment score have been significant?

The

replications proposed above would hopefully remove any doubt
about this question.

I

predict, however, that even with

larger ranges of responses there will be no significant

effect of novelty.

This prediction is based partly on the

fact that the differences between familiar and novel

scenarios were not nearly significant on many measures, and

partly on the fact that the means had switched ordinal
position as the highest average for the ten year-olds on the
offspring question.

This thesis shows that the ability to infer novel

properties to novel examples of known categories is not
developing, at least within the age range tested.

All

participants scored approximately equally on the novel and
familiar natural items, since there were no age by novelty
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interactions on any of the measures,

if the information was

available to the participants, they used it
equally well on
the novel items, regardless of age.

Thus it seems that Keil's experiment, with a
few

modifications, was able to shed new light on the
structure of
the theories behind categories like natural kinds.
Since all
participants, children and adults alike, generalize novel

properties to novel animals, they are probably using some

variant of a rule system.

Also, the Theory Theory, unlike

any of the early models of categorization, can incorporate

such a rule system into it's current model of categorization.

To account for children's and adults' ability to generalize

variable properties to novel items, the structure for the
Theory Theory, or any future models of categorization, must
include a rule or variable manipulating mechanism.
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APPENDIX A

SCRIPTS

presented in this appendix according to type of
5^"^^^
^^^^^ correspond to placement
SJnf; of forward
?n^?h^
in the order
presentation.
Preamble

For adult participants only
This experiment is designed for seven and ten year old
children. We are testing adults on the same concepts.
Please take the questions relatively seriously, even though
they may seem a little simplistic to an adult.
For all participants
What we're going to do today is, I'm going to show you some
pictures, and tell you some stories about them, and then ask
you some questions. OK?

The stories are all about a group of very good doctors who
perform special operations. Have you ever heard of
operations called plastic surgery? That's where a doctor can
change how a person's face looks so they look like someone
totally different ... well, that's the kind of operations
these doctors are going to do. They are going to change the
way things look.
Familiar Natural Objects

Horse

- Zebra - 2
The doctors took a horse and did an operation that dyed
black and white stripes all over its body. They braided its
tail, and they operated on its mane to make it stiffer, so it
would stand up like the bristles of a toothbrush. When they
were all done, the animal looked just like this.
When the doctors were finished, what kind of animal was
1)
it? Was it a horse or a zebra?
OK, why isn't it a
2)
?
What kind of babies do you think it would have? Would it
3)
have zebra or horse babies?
Do you think it would like to live in a bathtub?
4
)

Potato - Apple - 3
The doctors took a potato and did surgery that took the
eyes (those black spots) from the outside, and put them in
middle in the inside. They polished the outside until it was
shiny and smooth. They dyed the outside red. They gave it
shots of sugar to make it sweeter. Finally they pushed a
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stem into the top, and when they pushed it in,
the top and
bottom were dented. Now it looks like this.
What is it now, is it a potato or an apDle?
1)
Why isn't it a
2)
?
^"""^
""^^^^ ^^^"9
planted it in
what would grow, an apple tree or a potato plant? the ground,
Do you think it would make a good baseball?
4)

Tiger

Lion - 7
The doctors took a tiger, like this, and bleached his
fur so that the black stripes went away and the orange parts
looked yellow. Then they gave him a lot of thick hair around
his head, and a little puff of fur at the end of his tail.
When the doctors were done, he looked like this.
Now, when the doctors were all done, and the animal looks
1)
like this, what kind of animal is he? is he a tiger or a
lion?
OK, why isn't he a
2)
?
Do you think he would like to sleep in your bed?
3)
If he had babies, what kind of babies would they be?
4)
Lions or tigers?
-

Raccoon - Skunk - 8
The doctors took a raccoon and shaved away some of its
fur. They put the extra fur on its tail so it was big and
fluffy. They dyed the fur all black. Then they bleached a
single stripe all white down the center of its back. Then,
with surgery, they put in its body a sac of super smelly
odor. When they were all done the animal looked like this.
1) After the operation, what kind of an animal was it? A
skunk or a raccoon?
2) OK, why do you think that?
Do you think it would like to watch TV?
3)
If
it had babies, what kind of babies would it have?
4)
Raccoons or Skunks?
Novel Natural Objects

Tazier - Koala - 1
This is a tazier (TAH-ZEER). She lives in the trees in
tropical rain forests. She has long thin fingers to get a
good grip on the tree branches when she climbs. She is also
nocturnal, which means that she sleep during the day, and
comes out to eat bugs at night. Her big eyes help her see
well in the dark.
The doctors took the tazier and made her eyes smaller.
her claws instead of those skinny fingers. They
gave
They
to make her body thicker and furrier.
surgery
also did
her fur gray. Now she looks like this.
dyed
Finally, they
is all done, and she looks like
operation
Now that the
1)
she? Is she a koala or a
is
animal
this, what kind of
tazier?
OK, why do you think that?
2)
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^

babies, what kind of animal would they
be?
ILil^.l^^
Would they be taziers or koalas?
4)

DO you think she could play the
guitar now?

Guitarfish

Shark - 5
?^ftarfish. It lives in the ocean near the
r^r-ihHofn ^^rt ^"^^^^
fl^t on the bottom of the ocean
^
H K^^""*
and
hide
its mouth is on the bottom of its head,
so i? eats
scraps of food left on the sea floor
the fish, and made its head narrow, not
TtrfJnn?!^
like a
triangle. ^^H^
They made its mouth bigger, and gave it a
''^^y "'^^^
it looked like this.
^7 Now
Mo.?.^^r^;K
that the ""J?^"
1)
doctors are all done, and the fish looks
^^^^ i^
""^^^ u"-""?
^
^ guitarfish?
9t T,.^
Why do you think
2)
that?
Do you think it would tell funny jokes?
3)
What kind of babies would it have, guitarfish or
4)
sharks?
-

Soursop - Cucumber - 6
This is a Soursop. it's a fruit that grows in the
Caribbean, which is a bunch of islands south of Florida, it
is big, and has a rough skin,
it has lots of little black
seeds inside, and tastes a little sour. We, in America make
lemonade out of sour tasting lemons and water and sugar, and
they make drinks out of the soursop that way, too. They also
make ice cream out of the soursop by adding milk, vanilla,
water and sugar.
The doctors took the soursop, and sucked all the insides
out, so the skin shriveled up and got a little darker. They
bleached the seeds so they were white, and they took most of
the sour taste out of the fruit by soaking it in water for a
long time. Then, they tried to put everything back in, but
the skin had shrunk so they could only get half of the
insides back in. It wasn't so round anymore, when they were
all done it looked like this.
So now that the doctors are all done, and it looks like
1)
this, what kind of plant is it? a cucumber or a Soursop?
2) Uh huh, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it would like to sing?
4) If you took the seeds, and planted them, what would grow?
A Soursop plant or a cucumber plant?

Hoatzin - Goose - 11
This is a special bird that lives in the jungle of
Guatemala. It's called a Hoatzin (WAT-ZEEN)
When it is
young, it has extra claws on its wings and uses all four sets
of claws to climb trees. When it is older, like this one,
the claws fall off, but it still uses its wings to climb
trees like arms.
The doctors took the hoatzin, and dyed its belly white.
They gave it a longer neck, and a long, skinny head and beak.
Then they gave it webbed feet instead of claw feet. Finally,
they made its tail shorter. Now it looks like this.
.
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.

2)

How do you know that?
°'

'"^''^^^

Hoatz^ns?''^''''
Do you think it
4)

^^^"^

^ill have?

Geese or

would like to dance?
Artifacts

Key

-

Coin

- 4

^ ^^^y^ like this, and heated it until
it wafso'^hnr^h.^T^
It
was so hot that they could mold it
into a circle. Then
''^''''^^
machine
^
that pressed the
l^^
^"^^ P^^""®^
"^^t^l
that
""^^^
had pictures on them
ttJ:
fv.
When
the
circle came out, it looked like this.
""^^^
the stuff looks
TIvoTA-^^^">,^^^.'^°^^°^^
^^"""^
^hi^g
is it? a coin or a key?
ot
^''f
u^^^
Z) Uh huh, how do you know that?
3) Do you think it would be heavy?
4) Could you break it in half?
'

Soccer Ball - Bowling Ball - 9
The doctors took a soccer ball that looked like this.
They painted it all black, and cut three little holes in
it.
Then, they filled it with some really dense plastic, so it
was really heavy. When the doctors were done, it looked like
this
So now that the doctors are all done, and it looks like
1)
this, what kind of ball is it? A bowling ball or a soccer
ball?
2) Uh huh, how do you know that?
3) Would it still be able to roll down a hill?
4) Could you plug it in and listen to the radio?

Umbrella - Flag - 10
The doctors took an umbrella, like this, and they took
the cloth parts off. They cut up the cloth, and re-sewed it
to look like a rectangle. Then they dyed the rectangle in
three big stripes of red, yellow and blue. Then they bent
the metal handle so it was a straight pole. They used the
extra metal from the spines of the umbrella to attach the
cloth to the pole. When they were done with the operation,
it looked like this.
1) When they were finished, what kind of thing was it? was it
an umbrella or a flag?
2) OK, why isn't it a
?
3) Do you think it will taste good?
Do you think it looks like a flag of a country?
4
)

Trash can - Mailbox - 12
The doctors took a trash can that looked like this.
They slit it down the side, and took some of the metal out so
it would go straight up, not flare out at the top. They
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pounded the can flat on three sides, and
left one side
curved. They took the extra metal and
made a lid for the
^i^^ of the can. They
n^?;i-^H^-L
^i^^ ^? P""^ °"
^^^y
^^^^
they put the
?htn^ on ?
thing
top of a tall piece of wood, so that it
looked like

1

1) When the doctors were done, what kind of thing did
they
have? A trash can or a mailbox?
2) OK, why do you think that?
3) Do you think it could feel sad?
4) Does it look like your mailbox at home?
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Cucumber
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